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iPREFACE
Throughout the study of political science 
there has appeared time and again, varied conceptions 
of the natural- law. Wow, there is no need to stress 
the importance derived from a correct conception of 
the natural law, since all political thinkers know that 
sound government can only be derived from a body of 
sound laws and ultimately sound laws must be based 
upon a sound foundation; and this foundation can be 
termed synonomously as the natural law* It is an 
historical fact that a society is good only in prop­
ortion to the laws governing it. Therefore, in order to 
maintain a good society, there must of necessity exist 
good and just laws; and in order to insure the charact­
er of such laws, they must necessarily spring from or 
be based upon a firm and just foundation.
Thus the purpose of this thesis is to prove 
in detail that foundation, which the author maintains 
to be the only foundation - the scholastic conception 
of the natural law. In order to achieve this purpose 
two avenues of approach have been deemed appropriate - 
which account for the thesis being divided into two 
parts.
In order that this conception might have a 
firm and sure foundation, it seemed desirable to begin
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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by assembling into the first part what might be termed 
an historical back-ground of the natural law. It seemed 
only fitting to begin such an historical treatment 
with a study of the natural law as perceived in the 
minds of the Greeks, the founders of Political Science, 
and the Stoics, since to them is credited the univer­
salizing of the conception of their predecessors.
Since the Romans were the first to codify their laws 
and stress such an importance of * jus gentium* which 
they held to be synonomous with natural law, it was 
well to treat of their conception.
Following the Roman era, a new philosophy 
of law came to the fore in the teachings of Christ 
and the conception of this period is appropriately 
termed the Christian conception of which the schol­
astic conception is an emanation.
An historical approach entails quotations 
upon quotations. However, while it has been necessary 
in some instances to borrow English versions for the 
occasion, the majority of the quotations from the Greeks, 
the Stoics, the Romans and Christians have been drawn 
from more or less familiar authors and their works*
The crux of this thesis is found in the second 
part which is based entirely upon the writings of St. 
Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suarez. The works of these 
men were greatly drawn upon in order to prove and clarify
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
iii
the scholastic conception of the natural law. Thus the 
first chapter of the second part is given to a treatment 
of the conception of St* Thomas; and the second chapter 
of the second part is given to a treatment of the 
conception of Suarez, which is used more or less to 
render a final blow to the proof.
The purpose of the introductory chapter is to 
bring to one*s attention the conception of the natural 
law to be treated which is at once fundamental and 
universally accepted,albeit oftentimes overlooked bec­
ause of its very familiarity. Fortunately, though 
our perception of it may grow dim, truth does not wear 
out, and there can only be one true concept of the 
natural law. We may fail to notice it - may even forget 
it, to our sorrow - but a reminder brings it before us 
again as enduring and solid as ever. The introductory 
chapter, then, is a reminder of the truths found in the 
scholastic conception of the natural law, which, we 
believe, one cannot ignore without great peril to our­
selves and to posterity.
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AINTRODUCTION
It may safely be asserted that human beings 
have for untold centuries existed in some form of 
society* Why? The answer to the question, given more 
than twenty centuries ago and still accepted, is that 
man is a social animal, a gregarious being, and that 
his social needs make him likewise a political being, 
for he cannot permanently associate with others of his 
kind, in groups large or small, without some form of 
social organisation* What may have been the first form 
of social organization we do not know, and it is not 
within the present field to speculate on that subject*
The admitted fact of that organization, developed by 
the use of human reason, is our starting point* Now 
an organization cannot be established, or onee establish­
ed cannot continue to exist, without rules* What does 
this imply? This Implies that at the base of society 
there must exist a fundamental, universal and immutable 
law; and these are the main attrbutes of the natural low*
The question which inevitably confronts us is - 
What is this natural law? And no answer can be given 
without further questions concerning origin and develop­
ment of the natural law. lhat are the elements that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Bconstitute it? What is its purpose? Wherein does it have 
its foundation?
Human beings are reasonable beings, and reason 
is a lamp distinguishing right from wrong* And the human 
conception of good as distinguished from evil by the 
light of reason is fpund in the natural law* Thus the 
natural law is the foundation of all just laws* wThe 
supreme dictates of conscience,” says the most Reverend 
Archbishop Araleto Giovanni Cicognani, Apostolic Deleg­
ate to the United States, in his admirable volume on 
canon law, "are the same for all mankind and consequently 
must derive from some common source which is the prop­
erty of all. And that source is nothing else than the
light of reason manifesting to us what is good and
*
what is evil - in a word, the natural law*"
The concluding and all important question, 
whose answer will solve the purpose of this thesis, 
is: Why was the study of natural law taken as the 
theme of this thesis? What were the difficulties pert­
aining to the natural law?
Men all through the ages have recognized the 
existence of a certain fundamental something hidden in 
their very natures. From the questions of what that 
something was, or from whence did it have its Origin,
or what sanctioned it* there arose many and varied______
^English version of ’Jus Canonicum’ by the Rev* O ’Hara 
and the Rev* Brennan* p * £ 5 * ______________
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Cconceptions*
Man is a rational creature and in his nature 
God has implanted certain guiding norms or principles 
to enable him to,acheive his last end and fulfill the 
purpose of his creation* The Greeks strove for the 
*highest good* but their guiding norm was based upon 
pure reason. Therefore, they conceived of the natural 
law from a rational point of view* Later, the Romans 
making use of some of the philosophical ideals of their 
predecessors based their foundation of law on the *law 
of nature* meaning that law found its ultimate sanction 
in nature* Because of such a procedure, the Romans reg­
arded the Imperial Law as the foundation of all law and 
as a sanction *legibus solutus** This idea permeated 
throughout history* It was found to be at the base of 
the conception of law in the views of Machlavelli,
Bodin, Luther, King James, and a number of others*
The difficulties arising from such a conception of the 
natural law was that in one case, the law was suprmme 
with a pure rational sanction, unstable as the law itdelfj 
in another case, the ruler was supreme and thus the 
sanction would depend upon the will of the ruler and 
would thus suffer change in accordance with the changing 
will of the ruler; in another case, the natural law was 
considered to be the body of laws still in use develop­
ed from time, usage and custom; and therefore, it would
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Dchange in accordance with the change of time, circumstances 
and custom; and in still another case, the natural law was 
considered to he the common law of the people at that 
particular time and in that particular place* And as such, 
no body of law could ever he stable for it would lack the 
necessary foundation for stability* And a society is stable 
in proportion to its laws, Therefore, in order to have a 
sound body of la?/ there must of necessity exist a law 
that is universal, Immutable and eternal in its principles 
sanctioned by its Eternal Creator*
The most learned of jurists have accepted the 
Scholastic conception of the natural law for the foundation 
of a sound system of jurisprudence, the development of 
a good society with the result - a stable government*
In order to bring out and prove the scholastic 
stand-point on the natural law, the defense is taken from 
the works of whom we consider to be two of the most 
distinguished bulwarks of Scholasticism - St* Thomas 
Aquinas, the 'Doctor Angelicas', and Francisco Suarez, 
the 'Prince of Modern Jurists'*
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Historical Background, 
of tlie 
natural law
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1CONCEPTION OF THE NATURAL LAW 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
ANCIENT GREEKS
Before delTing into the conception of the 
Greeks in regards to the natural law and its effect on 
the past, the present and the future, it will be well 
to consider for a moment the Greek civilization prior to 
the Christian era*
From a political standpoint, ancient Greece 
was built up of city-states similar to a series of 
units varying in size and power and form of government, 
but all of them as small communities which could not 
be termed states in the modern territorial sense of the 
word# In this respect they greatly differed from the 
vast empires of the last, and with rapidly growing 
Rome, dominated with imperial ambitions# And as their size 
was incomparable in proportion to modern standards, so 
also were their populations small in comparison with 
great cities of other lands and other times# In the 
Golden Age of Greece, Athens was said to have had a 
population of 300,000 residents, of whom probably half 
were citizens and the remaining population consisting 
of resident aliens and slaves# However, many of the 
other states were much smaller, a few thousand inhabit­
ants dwelling in a few square miles*
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2The Greek highly prized the separate and inde­
pendent status of his community} he cherished the opport­
unity afforded by the small size of his state to take 
an active and personal part in the affairs of government* 
Moreover, he regarded his own small community as not 
only having an historical continuity with the other 
Greek communities but a distinct individuality which 
they were ready to defend to the utmost* The city-state 
was on the whole a self-sufficient state, often democratic 
in form, always proud of its independence and of its 
special characteristics as compared with other states*
The fact that the Greeks sought for the perf­
ection of small political communities rather than a vast
empire like the Romans had important consequences for the
1
world of our day, but none was more important than the 
fact that the small communities made it possible for each 
and everyone of their inhabitants to feel an immediate 
and personal interest in the government of his state and 
to take a direct part in it* Thus government in the demo­
cratic states especially became a matter for discussion 
not by a few but by all citizens.
The Greeks were the first to inaugerate such a 
theory. For prior to this government meant the rule of 
one who possessed complete power and jurisdiction over
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3his subjects#
The environment of the land endowed the Greeks
with a great zest for living and with speculative minds#
Such problems as concerning man and nature, of laws, of
society, of understanding human relations, of discerning
and protecting common interests, aroused in them an eager
curiosity# They were forever seeking the answers to the
questions of *How* and *Why*# “They attempted to conceive
of the universe in the light of reason*” And because
they were interested in humanity, they were seldom content
to leave to one or to a few the exclusive management of
their common affairs. What was the business of one should
be the business of all# In the language of a distinguished
authority, “The state is in fact, as the Greeks called it,
\ /
T °  K.olVov'toommoll interest* or, as the Romans said,
3
*Res Publics* everybody*s business*** However,absurd the 
strict application of such a theory may become, at any 
rate is far more in keeping with human dignity than contrar­
iwise. The Greek recognition of the truth that man Is not 
only a social but a political being as well opened a way 
to the future and the complimentary truth that it is 
indeed a right and a duty for man to take part in political 
life. The Greeks perceived these truths with their accust­
omed clearness, and having seen them they unceasingly 
set their speculative minds to seeking the principles of
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4government, based upon sound, principles of law, principles 
developed purely through the channels of reason.
The Greeks left the past behind them, yet they 
maintained a deep reverence for their traditions and those 
unwritten laws which had claimed their obedience and resp­
ect for many centuries and about which they formed the 
principles of their government. They strived for progress, 
to build for the future, and what they built was based 
on the circumstances of their own day; what they built 
has endured and in their building they set forth the 
foundation for the governing of cities and of states.
In a few illuminating sentences we can readily 
surmise our debt to the Greeks who, some twenty-five cent­
uries ago, faced the fundamental problems of human life 
with clearness of thought straight through to logical 
and still unassailable conclusions*
"The seeds of almost all that we count best in 
human progress were sown in Greece# The conception of 
beauty as a joy in itself and as a guide in life was first 
and most vividly expressed in Greece, and the very laws 
by which things are beautiful or ugly were to a great 
extent discovered there and laid down# The conception of 
freedom and Justice, freedom in body, in speech and in 
mind, justice between the strong and the weak, the rich 
and the poor, penetrates the whole of Greek ethical thought,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5and was, amid obvious flaws, actually realized, to a remark­
able degree in tbs best Greek communities. The conception 
of truth as an end to pursue for its own sake, a thing 
to discover and puzzle out byexperiment and imagination 
and especially by Reason, a conception essentially allied 
with that of Freedom. One stands amazed sometimes at the
i
perfect freedom of their thought. Another conception came 
rather later, when the small city-states with exclusive 
rights of citizenship had been merged In a larger wholej 
the conception of the universal fellowship between man 
and man founded upon a universal and eternal principle. 
Greece realized soon after the Persian war that she had 
a mission to the world, that Hellenism stood for the 
higher life of man as against barbarism, for Arete, or 
Excellence, as against the mere effortless average. First 
came the crude patriotism which regarded every Greek 
as superior to every barbarian; then came reflection, 
showing that not all Greeks were bearers of the true 
light, nor all barbarians its enemies; that Hellenism was 
a thing of the spirit and not dependent on the race to 
which a man belonged or the place where he was born. Then 
came the new word and coneeption-humanitas, which to the 
Stoics made the world as one brotherhood. No people known 
to history clearly formulated these ideals before the 
Greeks, and those who have spoken the words afterwords 
seemed for the most part to be merely echoing the thoughts
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of old Greek men.”
Greek political philosophy seems prone at times 
to underemphaslze the rights of the man in considering Ihe 
duties of the citizens* However, this defect is largely 
compensated hy the fact that to the Greeks in their 
Golden Age government was a constitutional procedure, 
with citizens in public assembly as the ultimate author­
ity, with an administration of the state by chosen officials 
with specifically limited powers, and with law supreme 
over everyone* “It is fitting that not the threats of a 
man but the clear tones of the law should be master of 
the happy* *.. The safety of the citizens should not rest
upon those who flatter the powerful and deceive the people,
5
but upon confidence in the laws”.
Though they held law supreme, the Greeks did not 
treat of it as a legal science. The philosophical basis 
of the development of law - morality, justice and equity, 
and later equality and liberty - they thought out and
discussed at great lengths and their views always lacked
6
a definite sanction* In theory the Greeks regarded law 
as a political science. Even the laws of Plato were more 
a political than a legal treatise* This conception is the 
result of the unrecognized infiltration of the principles 
of the natural law though not taken or understood to be 
as such* In the study of Greek laws one can readily detect
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7the absence of an ultimate and eternal end and a similar
sanction* Their conception was acceptable as far as it
went; however, its distance was bounded in the realm of
the mind* For to them law was not an end but a means
for promoting goodness and justice among citizens as a
part of the larger purpose of the state, which was not
7
"life only”, but a "good life”. They regarded their
state to be essentially a moral society directed toward
a moral end, the good life of its inhabitants* The
political thought produced by the city-state conceived
the state as a moral association, and as a result approach-
8
ed its subject from an ethical point of view. The law
which they recognized as their sovereign in the state
9
was therefore "a complex of ethical rules” based firmly 
upon fundamental and universally recognized principles 
of morality or based upon what we conclude to be their 
conception of the natural law, for it was from these 
principles that their law derived its binding force.
Thus law was a means of applying these principles to the 
relations of human beings living together in society 
for the sake of a "good life”.
Therefore, the Greeks regarded the spirit of 
the law more important than the letter. For when a dis­
pute arose there were no legal procedure with the fine
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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wrong and to administer justice* The Greek philosophers 
were interested in the relations of laws to the ideas 
of right and wrong, and to this problem they rendered 
much thought and attention*
Was an act right ,they asked, because it con­
formed to the law, or were both the act and the law
right if and insofar as they coincided with an absoute
10
and eternal standard above the law? One answer was that 
what corresponded to the latter standard was natural 
right, but what corresponded to the humanly Imposed
11
customary or legal standard was conventional right*
Others held that justice was based on convention or
12
enactment rather than upon nature* Thus we have problems 
concerning the natural law existing as far back as 
twenty-five centuries ago*
Consequently, two ideas developed concerning 
their conception of the natural law* On the one hand 
their was the idea of law as human wisdom, ascertained 
and promulgated through the state* On the other hand 
there was the idea of law as the manifestation of an
immutable and eternal right and justice* In other words
there was the idea of lex and the idea of jus* This
double aspect of Greek thinking about law was due in part
to the peculiar problem of social control in the Greek
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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city-state involved in the perennial conflict between
oligarchies, hewing to the old traditions, and the demos
seeking to use political power as a means of maintaining
13
a standard of life*
lor example, in the government of Athens "there 
was a highly developed political life, with its appropriate 
and regular organs, which had attained to full self- 
consciousness* There freedom was claimed as a birth-right; 
and by freedom men understood the right of living as one 
liked in social matters, and the sovereignity of the maj­
ority in political affairs. Equality was a watchword; and 
equality meant Isonomy, or equity of law for all; Isotlmy 
or equal regard paid to all; Isagoria, or equal freedom 
of speech.Upon these^jjrinciples was based their conception 
of the natural law."
However, to further the example, Athens had sin­
ned, at least in Plato’s eyes, in the want of training 
for politics which disfigured her politicians; she had 
sinned still more because the spirit had invaded her 
laws, and the individual, in his claim for a false freed­
om and a false equality, had set himself up as the 
ultimate source of law. Thus the salvation of Greece 
was to be found in training the citizen for his work 
and to inculcate upon him his duty to the state, and 
applying their acts in accordance with an ideal supreme 
law* Only the just man could be called a citizen; and 
the man was just in proportion to his reason* For along
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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with Socrates, Plato maintained that reason, "the
rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of
15
the whole soul," should rule the inward man* It is the 
function of reason, that little part which rules, to 
direct the other elements of man*s nature and thus insure 
inward unity and self-control*"He is temperate who has these 
same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling 
principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit 
and desiwe are equally agreed that reason ought to 
rule*" In a word, the just man must be both a reasonable 
and a reasoning man, for "the sacred and golden cord of 
reason" is, as Plato tells us, "the common law of the state."
In speaking thus of a "common law" does not, of 
course mean human legislation, but rather a fundamental 
law - that * right reason* which, in a later era, was to 
become identified with the law of nature. It is, in a 
sense, but another aspect of the Platonic idea of good 
which is discoverable by the philosopher through the use 
of reason, and which corresponds to a certain extent 
with the modern conception of a law of nature, or of a 
final cause, or of both in one. This is the fundamental 
credo which underlies the conception of natural law in 
the mind of the Greeks* Their supreme law had its 
beginning, sanction and end based upon pure reason and 
as such reasoh could be termed synonomously with their 
conception of the natural law*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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CONCEPTION OF THE NATURAL LAW 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
STOICS
Now the legal concepts built for the city-states 
were more or less fundamentally sound, but if they were 
to be applied to a changing order of things, a certain 
amount of adaptation was necessary* It is this process 
which must now be considered for along with the changing 
order there appears another conception of the natural 
law*
For its beginning we must turn back a hundred 
years to the latter part of the fifth century, when a 
strong patriotic attachment to small political units 
was common to all Greeks. At this time Antisthene*, a 
disciple of Socrates, founded the Cynic School, whose 
members rebelled against the theory and conventions of 
the city-state, substituting for them the ideals of 
individual self-sufficiency on the basis of reason, and 
a vague cosmopolitanism.As such the conception of the nat­
ural law was as variable as the reason of the individual 
varied. However, the social ideal of Diogenes, the great
cynic, appears to have been "the removal of all barriers
18
that divide man from man," and perhaps the establishment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of some kind of world, state because of an innate certain 
principle which was the same in all men and which was 
linked with man's nature.
But on the whole, the philosophy of the Cynics 
was largely materialistic and concerned with rebellion 
and denial rather than affirmation* This was found to be 
true especially with regards to universal principles.
The members of the school were radicals in the lengths 
to which their revolt led them, and the fact that many 
of them carried their theories to extremes,
lor the present purposes, however, the import­
ance of the Cynics lies less, perhaps, in their tenets 
than in the fact that they are a connecting link between 
the classical Greek philosophy in the field of ethics 
and the immediate conception of the Stoics,
The Stoics adopted in some measures the tenets 
of the Cynics, And like their precursors, the Stoics 
were Socratic in the belief that knowledge is the basis 
of virtue, of moral conduct; and thus restricting the 
natural law to,the realm of pure reason with the'end 
to be found in material good. But it was not knowledge 
derived from abstract speculation so much as from sense 
impressions which were co-ordinated by reason. To the 
Stoics, as to Socrates, reason was supreme, but in a 
somewhat different manner. &eno, the founder of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Stoic School, conceived of reason as at once divine and 
all-pervading. It was his doctrine that
“God is mind, God is soul, God is nature:
It is God that holdeth the universe together*
The artificer and disposer of the universe 
Is the word, and the word is reason;
He is fate.
He is the determining cause of all things,
19
He is Zeus.“
Thus, “the Stoics asserted that the world is
a product of reason, and that all the laws of nature
20
dim in the long run at reasonable ends." Reason here 
becomes identified on the one hand with a universal 
mind or soul,.and on the other hand with a universal 
ruling principle, or law and thus making their conception 
purely materialistic.
Furthermore, Zeno proclaimed that 
"In all .things is the divine;
21
The law of nature is divine.**
A logical conclusion then would seem that the 
natural law as he conceived it would be merely a thing.
How man was a part of this divine and all- 
embracing system; thus it was his duty, Zeno taught, 
to live in harmony with it*
"The fulfillment of a man*s life 
Is to live in accord with nature;
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So to live is to live in righteousness,
For nature leadeth to righteousness,
And the end of life is to live in accord with virtue528 
Here it can readily he seen that the end of 
man is purely naturalistic thus limiting the natural law 
to the material welfare of the individual* Righteousness, 
according to the Stoic teacher, was man’s true destiny*
“Man is horn solely for righteousness,
For righteousness draweth to itself the souls of men 
With no lure, no offerings from without,
But of its own splender.
Virtue of itself is sufficient for happiness; 
Righteousness is the sole and only good,
23
And nothing is evil save that which is vile and base*“ 
Thus accordingly, Zeno taught his followers 
that they should choose the good and reject the evil#
But what of the things that were neither good nor evil?
These the Stoics classified as “indifferent”:
“Of things there are, some there are 
Which are good and some which are evil,
And some which are neither good nor evil.
And the good are these:
Wisdom, Sobriety, Justice and Fortitude.
And the evil are these:
Folly, Intemperance, Injustice and Cowardice.
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And things that are neither good nor evil are 
indifferent#.
And things indifferent are these:
Life and death, good repute and ill repute,
Pain and pleasure, riches and poverty,
24
Sickness and health, and such like.”
But man himself could not he Indifferent. He 
must choose between good and evil; But they seemed to 
overlook the ultimate reason why. By his choice he placed 
himself into one of two categories into which the Stoics 
separated mankind*
”And of men there are two sorts,
The upright man and the wicked man;
And the upright man all his life
Will do the things that are right,
25
But the ways of the wicked are evil•w
Throughout the study of the Stoic doctrines 
where good and evil are mentioned one can perceive no 
norm or measurement upon which a thing is proclaimed 
good or evil. Zeno regarded men foolish if they were wicked 
and wise if they were good. However, he makes no mention 
as to what acts made a man wicked or good. It is true 
that he speaks of being virtuous and righteous but he 
evades the question as to what makes or sanctions a 
virtuous act* He proceeds in saying that
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'‘The wise man is blessed, the wise man is rich;
Only the wise, however needy they be, are rich;
Only the wise, however ill-favored, are beautiful;
For the lineaments of the soul
26
Are more beautiful than those of the body*"
The most fundamental maxim of the Stoic philos­
ophy was that the life of a man should be in harmony 
with nature* This maxim is subject to diverse interpret­
ation* "live according to nature is at first sight the
2?
most ambiguous of precepts." The Stoics, however, used 
the expression with a definite meaning. They maintained 
that all things are subject to a universal order> which 
is arranged by, or rather is conceived as being, a 
supreme and all-pervading intelligence.
All creatures are part of this universal scheme 
of things, but the part of man as a rational creature, 
differs from that of other animals*"Now man, as well as 
other creatures, has his specific function, or nature 
in the Stoic sense, as part of the cosmlcal plan. But, 
unlike other creatures, he can fulfill it with conscious 
intelligence and choice. He may know his station in the 
world, and know also that in maintaining it he is ful­
filling the purpose of the supreme Reason* By the very 
fact of being addressed to an understanding agent the 
command *Idve according to nature* becomes ’Live according
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to Reason1”*
Thus reason was regarded as a guide or standard 
for human life* However, one is tempted to ask,"Where is 
the sanction in the Stoic scheme of morality?” How does 
it answer the question which some regard as the very 
first that moral philosophy is hound to answer - Why 
should I do right? The answer is not without interest to 
a world troubled over the topic of sanctions in one 
form or another* However, sanction as existed in the 
Stoic system was internal and made itself felt in the 
conscience of the individual. The Stoics taught that the 
wise man was the good man; but the question comes up - 
as to their conception of goodness* The Greeks regarded 
goodness as performing ondfe functions well* Here the Greeks 
fell upon a scientific conception which Phusis, a word 
which we translate as ’nature1, but which seems to mean 
a process of growth by which every living thing perfeets 
itself. Thus, if one analyzes this process, one will 
find that Phusis is shaping each thing towards the 
fulfillment of its own function - that is, towards 
the good*
To the Stoics this Phusis was at work everywhere* 
It was like a soul, or a life force, running through all 
matter as the soul or life of a man runs through all 
his limbs; it is the soul of the world* This Phusis had
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still another aspect. In Zeno*a time the natural sciences 
had made a great advance, especially Astronomy, botany, 
and Natural History. This fact had made people familiar 
with the notion of natural law. Law was a principle 
which ran through all the movements of what theybcalled 
the Cosmos*, or ordered world. Thus Phusis, the life 
of the world, is, from another point of view, the law 
of mature; it is the great chain of causation hy which 
all events occur; for the Phusis which shapes things 
toward their end acts always hy the laws of causation. 
Phusis is not a sort of arbitrary personal goddess, 
upsetting the natural order; but it is the natural order 
and nothing happens without a causej it is a natural law 
which is alive, which is itself life. It becomes indist­
inguishable from a purpose, the purpose of the great world 
process. Thus it is clear then that these concepts 
contained important implications which were developed 
into the tenets of the Stoic doctrine. If man is to 
employ his reason in the attainment of his end he must 
be free. Not only that but under the universal law is 
a plain of equality with all other men. And again, since 
he is a rational creature possessed of freedom and a 
status of equality, he is individually responsible for 
his own development. In this sense each man stands alone 
and the Stoic is an individualist* Yet, on the other 
hand, he is also part, with all other human beings,
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” •••of one stupendous whole
2 9
fhoae body nature Is, and God the soul."
And in this sense, which deeply impressed itself upon the 
Stoics, he emerges as a citizen of the world. All men 
are individuals, they are free and equal: hut they are 
also brothers in a common humanity knit together by the 
bounds of reason, of a purpose common to all, and of a 
universal law of nature.
There are two distinct types of Stoic,"one
SO
who defies the world and one who works with the world,"
The Homans adopted the latter type of Stoic thought*
They accepted Stoicism as a philosophy but in the course 
of time they endowed it with the attributes of religion. 
Since the conquest of Greece, this philosophy 
had been received with favor by the Romans, and was espec­
ially cultivated by the more intelligent classes. For 
Instance, Gioerd accepted with little change the ethical 
principles of the Stoics, The Stoic philosophy became 
an important element in Roman education and culture, 
and received the almost uninterrupted support of the 
state during the period in which the influence of the 
Roman jurisconsults was most marked.
The Prevalence of a philosophy so vigorous 
and elevating as that of Stoicism could not fail to 
affect the fundament&l conceptions and the habits of
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thought of all those persons who were brought under its 
Influence* It will not be difficult for us to find in this 
system certain doctrines, which, however vague and speculat­
ive they may appear in the writings of the Greek: theohists 
were yet capable of a practical application in the hands 
of.Roman jurists, in solving questions regarding the 
rights and duties of men in civil society and the fund­
amental law which upheld them as such.
The point of contact between the Stoic philos­
ophy and the Roman laws is to be found in the theory of 
the law of nature - which the Stoics had deduced from their 
conception of the universe, and which the Roman jurists 
employed, under the name * jus naturaleT, to indicate the 
natural or ^hlcal foundation upon which the civil law 
must rest. With the Stoics, the universe was considered 
as imbued with an all-pervading soul or power, which 
was looked upon not only as a dynamical force producing 
motion, but as a rational principle producing order and 
perfection. This rational principle is a constituent 
element of all being. It is revealed not only in the 
external nature as a law of the physical world, but also 
in the original nature of all men as a guide for human 
conduct. The great duty of man is, henee, to discover and 
confirm to the highest law of reason, as this law is
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set forth in the essential constitution of his nature,
“To live in harmony with nature" was thus the highest 
precept of the Stoic philosophy, and the ultimate 
principle which must guide men in all relations of life#
By his original constitution ,man is a participant of the 
Universal Reason, and hy the exercise of his rational fac** 
ulties he can discover the law of nature, so far as It is 
necessary to control his own conduct* When looked at 
from a moral point of view, The law of nature can thus 
he regarded as the highest rule of human conduct, and 
thus the ultimate standard by which all human actions 
whether individual, social, or civil, must he judged.
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CONCEPTION OF THE NATURAL LAW 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
HOMANS
The conception of the natural law worked its way 
into Roman thought, and was used to explain, not only 
the foTOfiatlon of individual and social morality, but 
also the basis of legal rights and duties. Prom the time 
of Cicero to that of Alexander Severus, the legal liter­
ature of Rome is pervaded with the idea that law has a 
more ultimate foundation than custom or convention - that 
it is founded in the very nature of things. The first 
important attempt made by the Homan writers to ground 
law upon nature we find in the laws of Cicero, where 
the fundamental proposition is laid down that man is 
born for justice, and that law and equity are not a 
mere establishment of opinion, but an institution of nat­
ure. However, the application of this principle in det­
ermining the rights and duties was reserved for the 
jurists of the Empire.
The influence of Stoicism upon the Roman jurists 
is not to be judged by any servile repetition of part­
icular moral precepts. It is to be judged rather than by thee 
prevalent belief in natural law as the ethical basis of
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civil law; by the general recognition of the supremacy 
of reason as a guide in civil action* It is sometimes 
claimed that tbe idea of natural law bad little in­
fluence upon Roman writers, on tbe ground tbat tbe 
term was rarely found in tbeir works; and wben it is, it 
is not used in tbe same sense as tbat of tbe Stoics*
But as a matter of fact, not only is tbe term 1natural 
law* specifically defined by tbe Institutional writers 
in an etbical sense, but tbe method of reasoning wbicb 
is used in tbeir interpretation of tbe law is founded 
upon tbe theory tbat civil law must be brought into 
harmony with natural justice - with what is right in 
tbe nature of things*
It was tbe law of nature wbicb supplied tbe 
need of a philosophy* Now the law of nature, in its 
relation to the*jus gentium*, may be looked upon 
as both a standard rooted in the moral nature of 
human beings, and as a system of general and universally 
accepted rules revealed by human reason. It was this 
conception of a law founded upon human nature and upon 
human reason, which ultimately found its place in the 
greatest codification of laws ever known - tbe Digest of 
Justinian*
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Historically speaking, Rome eventually overcame 
Greece. If Rome conquered Greece materially, Greece 
conquered Rome spiritually* In the legal domain, conquest 
was two-fold, resulting in the Roman acceptance of Roth 
the conception of the law of nature and the fundamental 
ethical doctrines of the Stoics* Thus the Roman jurists 
were destined to acquire a philosophic background. And 
it was Greece that supplied the philosophic background 
for Roman legal thought. The jurists examined their legal 
questions in the light ®f the fundamentals of the Greek 
law of nature which in the course of time had permeated 
the opinions of one Roman jurist after another*
However, the contribution of the jurists is of 
profound importance to the philosophy of law in general, 
and in particular to those who> believe that law should 
neither rest insecurely on the sands of expediency nor 
remain fast in the bog of tradition, but should grow 
from age to age toward advancing ideals*The development 
of Roman law had undergone various stages*
"It must be born in mind that * nature* did not 
mean to antiquity what it means to us who are iunder the 
influence of the idea of evolution. To the Greek, it 
has been said, the natural apple was not the wild one 
from which our cultivated apple has been grown, but 
rather the golden apple of the Hesperides* The 'natural* 
object was that which expressed most completely the 
idea of the thing. It was the perfect object. Hence the
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natural law was that which, expressed perfectly the idea 
of law applied to the subject in question; the one which 
gave to that subject its perfect development* For legal 
purposes reality was to be found in this ideal* perfect, 
natural law, and its organ was juristic reason* Legislat­
ion and the edict, so far as they had anymore than a 
positive foundation of political authority, were but 
imperfect and ephemeral copies of this jural reality*
Thus the jurists cams to the doctrine of the ratio legis, 
the principle of natural law behind the legal rule, 
which has been so fruitful both of practical good and 
of theoretical confusion in interpretation. Thus also 
they came to the doctrine of reasoning from the analogy 
of all legal rules, whether traditional or legislative, 
since all, so far as they had legal reality had it 
because and to the extent that they embodied and realized 
a principle of natural law.
Natural law was a philosophical theory for a 
period of growth. It arose to meet the exigencies of the 
stage of equity and natural law, one of the greatest 
creative periods of legal history. Yet...even the most 
rapid growth does not permit the lawyer to ignore the 
demands for stability. The theory of natural law was 
worked out as a means of growth, as a means of making
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a law of the world on the basis of the law of the Roman
cities which were old and strict* But it was worked
out also as a means of directing the law and organizing
its growth so as to'maintain the general security. It
was the task of the jurist to build and shape the law
on the basid of the old local materials so as to make
it an instrument for satisfying the wants of a whole
world while at the same time insuring uniformity and
predicability. They did this by applying a new but
known technique to the old materials. The technique
was one of reason; but it was a legal reason identified
with natural reason and worked out and applied under the
influence of a philosophical ideal. The conception of
natural law as something of which all positive law was but
declaratory as something by which actual rules were to be
measured, to which so far as possible they were to be
made to confirm, by which new rules were to be framed
and by which old rules were to be extended or restricted
in their application, was a powerful instrument in the
hands of the jurists and enabled them to perceive in their
31
task of legal construction with assured confidence.“
Thus we see that the theory of an ideal justice 
as contained in the natural law began to pass into pract­
ice in the administration of law at Rome and throughout
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its outlying possessions. If the theory did not entirely
pass into the practice of the Romans, neither has the
theory of to-day become the practice of to-day* Indeed,
it is the hope of the future that the entry of theory into
practice may never be complete, that theory may always
lead and illumine the way in a never-ending process*
"Ideals are not important solely because they
triumph, but rather because they furnish some principle
of rational guidance, some factor of intelligent control,
in a society which, lacking them, would scarcely arise
32
above the instinctive, the habitual, and the brutal***
If the ideal of justice embodied in the natural law never 
became in its full extent the justice administered in 
the*jus gentium* and the Roman law, never the less, the 
law of nature did permeate and guide the *jus gentium* 
and the ’jus civile* which Rome handed down to posterity.
It is interesting to note that the early Roman 
jurists possessed certain philosophical conceptions 
concerning the moral basis of law which were closely 
related to the ethical system of the Stoics* To make 
a few illustrations will be sufficient for the present*
"It is true that Ulplan gave a peculiar definit­
ion to the natural law - as that which nature teaches all 
animals - which conception exercised little or no influence
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upon the legal thought of Rome* But even Ulpian in other 
forms of expression recognized, like M s  contemporaries, 
an ethical standard of law; for example, when he defines 
justice as the ’constant desire to grant each one his 
right*; when he lays down as a fundamental precept of 
law, ’to live right, to hurt no one, to give each his 
due’; when he defines jurisprudence as ’the science 
of what is just’; and when, in speaking of the duties 
of the jurists, he says: ’We cultivate justice, and a 
knowledge of the right, distinguishing right from wrong, 
the lawful from the unlawful* (D,,1,1,1), But to cite 
from other jurists: Paulus refers definitely to the law 
of nature as a moral principle, when, in distinguishing 
the various meanings attached to the word ’jus*, he says; 
’That which is always right and good is called ’jus’, or 
rather * jus’ naturale’(D.,1,1,11), The belief that all law 
is limited and determined by nature is expressly declared
by Gelsus in the wprds: ’Things prohibited by nature can
53
be justified by no law’ (D.,50,17,188).*♦
It would be futile to attempt to draw an exact 
description between the * jus gentium’ and the natural 
law within these few pages. The term ’jus gentium’ was 
originally applied to the body of customs common to 
Roma and the states subject to Roman dominion. As the
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Roman conquests came to be looked uj>on as universal, 
the *jus gentium* was considered to be the law common 
to all nations. But still there was no philosophical 
meaning attached to the word. It was simply the sum of the 
ingredients which were found in the actual laws of 
existing communities; however, when viewed in the light 
of the natural law the *jus gentium* acquired a new 
significance* The ©ammon laws collected by the praetors 
were now believed to be based upon the natural law 
which the Universal Reason had instituted for all. men.
The fact that they were common seemed to prove that they 
were derived from universal principles inherent in the 
very nature of man. The tendency thus showed itself among 
the more philosophical jurists to identify the *jus gentium ** 
in the greatest sense, with the *jus naturale*, **In 
most cases, however, in the later latin the two express­
ions - * jus gentium* and * jus naturale* - are virtually 
34
synonomous? However, whether we are of the same opinion 
is not at question here,'
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THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION
OF THE 
NATURAL LAW
In the two preceding chapters we learned of 
the conceptions of the natural law first found among 
the immortal Greeks, who lay the foundation of political 
theory, and, second, the Romans who drew from the polit­
ical and legal principles developed hy the Greeks and 
put them into practice# However, with the passing of 
centuries, and unfortunately, throughout the epochs 
of human history, false prophets appeared who stifled 
the inner spirits of men with their distorted erroneous 
views concerning the just and right principles of the 
natural law. "Woe to you scribes and Pharisees, hypocrits: 
because you tithe mint, and anise, and cummin, and have
the weightier things-of the law, judgement, and mercy,
.,r 35
and faith#1* There was another and greater need for a 
prophet to bring back to the minds of men those “weightier 
matters of the law11 and to reveal in universal terms 
the goal of humanity*
However, He who took upon Himself such a 
tremendous task was a*man»of the town of Nazareth, of 
humble station but with a perfect vision of truth and 
light# Few among His peoples listened to His teachings.
For example, the scribes and Pharisees were rugged
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individualista, full of outward show and jealous of the
privileges which they claimed as rights. Likewise, the
men of law were as bad if not worse seeking to profit
by insisting on the letter and hiding the spirit of the
law: "Woe to you lawyers also, because you load men with
burdens which they cannot bear and yourselves touch not
the packs with one of your fingers. loe to you lawyers,
for you have taken away the key of knowledge: you yourselves
have not entered in, and those that were entering in, you
56
have hindered."
To these and to their followers the teachings
of Christ seemed a menace to the established order of
things* But Christ made no attempt to interfere in
political matters, telling His listeners "render to
Ceasar the things that are Geasar*s, and to God the things
57
that are Godfs*" But it was inevitable tbat one who should 
set aside all material rewards, which the rich and power­
ful prized so highly, should be regarded with a suspicion 
that grew into such a hostility that they had Him cruc­
ified, thinking to put an end to His truths* But the 
teachings which they sought to destroy were immortal,, 
as truth id, and the crucifixion but hastened the recog­
nition of their Divine nature and their acceptance as the 
supreme law of human life. The moral standard of the
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New Testament is the standard by which should be meas­
ured not only the individual actions of men and women, 
but also the actions of states and groups of states*
Because it is universal, and is for all time, human 
beings cannot fully attain it - at least in their present 
state of imperfection* But standards are not lowered by 
failures to reach tnem* If they were, the years of aur 
civilization would indeed be numbered.
There is, perhaps no verse in the New Testament
more often quoted and assuredly none with more meaning
for human beings in society, than the Golden Rule. "All
things therefore, whatsoever you would that men should
38
do to you, do you also to them*" Here we have the fund­
amental guiding principle for all human relationships*
It is an all Inclusive rule, for it demands truth, honesty, 
fairness, and neighborliness - all the qualities that 
men and nations would like others to show toward themselves. 
Thus the Golden Rule is indeed the natural law* It is the 
basic precept of our social morality, and the hope of the 
future is that we may one day accept it as the foundation 
of our political and legal morality, for ilthout its 
acceptance there aannot be "peace on earth towards men of 
good will**. And it may be added here that it is this 
conception treated in the light of philosophy that is 
accepted as the Scholastic conception*
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Turning now to the Christian conception proper
of the natural law, we find that St* Paul had spoken
39
of the law written in the hearts of men; and the
Christian theologians identified this with the law of
nature which the world had inherited from Greece and
Borne, “For it is interesting to notice that the Fathers
frequently*••connect their treatment of the natural law
with St* Pauls PHRASES in Romans, St. Ambrose, for
instance, says that it is the Apostle who teaches us
40
that the natural law is in our hearts," St. Augustine
likewise cites St. Paul’s "words in a passage in which
41
he divides law into three species"; and, "St. Hilary of
Poitiers does the same in describing the scope of the
natural law. He defines this as being that a man must not
injure his fellowman, must not take that which belongs
to another, must keep himself from fraud and perjury,
42
must not plot against another man’s marriage" - such
faults, it may be added, which are not unknown to-day.
And it is interesting to compare th&s with the definit-
43
ions of the natural law by St. Ambrose and by St.
44
Augustine. It is clear that these are derived from 
Cicero and other ancient writers. In this respect, 
therefore, it may be said that the links between the anc­
ient and Christian worlds are in the nature of a cont­
inuous chain.
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One last paragraph on the Christian conception 
of the natural law is that "it is unnecessary to mult­
iply quotations. There seems to be no division of opinion 
among the Fathers on this subject. Practically they 
carry on the same conceptions as those of Cicero and 
the later philosophers, and while they bring these into 
connection with the suggestions of St. Paul, they can­
not be said either to modify these inherited conceptions
45
or to carry them any further.”
Here we have the chain completed. Indeed we 
find that Cicero is so relied upon by the Fathers of 
the Church as almost to be considered as a pagan saint*
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Scholastic Conception 
of the 
Natural law
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SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 
AND THE 
NATURAL LAW
The flowering of medievil civilization may be
said to be represented in tbe thirteenth century* It was
an era scared by wars and clashing opinions* But these
disturbances did not jeopardise the progress of culture.
It was an era of high ideals, of awakening art, of
flourishing universities. In the realm of mind and spirit
the thirteenth centuryis crowning achievement was the
remarkable development of scholasticism* And for this
development the greatest of all schoolmen, the Doctor
Angelicas, was in a large measure responsible*
Time has conclusively proved that the theology
of St. Thomas was not of his day only. It survived both
46
his lifetime, and the centuries that followed, and in 
our time the Church has not only officially recognized 
his philosophy but has also prescribed his teachings
47
in Catholic institutions of learning throughout the world*
It is true that the teachings of St. Thomas 
have exercised vast influence* In connection with his doctrine 
it is important to note that he introduced the works of 
Aristotle to the world of his day. He prepared detailed 
commentaries on various works of Aristotle, and incorporated
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the very best of Aristotelianism into his own philosophy.
Thus he became, in the words of one writer, the "Christ-
48
ian Aristotle”, authoritatively interpreting the sage
of the ancient world to the Christian world of his day
and to the future, and combining as far as possible
the thought of both worlds* It has been said that his
system of philosophy depends "on three main authorities -
49
♦ ..Scripture, Aristotle, and St. Augustine,1* and in 
consequence, he left to posterity a masterly synthesis 
of Christian and pagan ideals.
The works of St. Thomas are many * more than 
sixty in number - covering the, entire field of theology, 
then considered an all-embracing science. But in this 
thesis we are concerned mainly with part one of the 
second part of his Summa Theologies in which he deals 
at length with the question of law; indeed, so fully did 
he treat of the subject that the sections refered to 
as questions 90-108 are appropriately called in the 
translation on the law a legal treatise. In order to 
grasp the nature and extent of the contribution which 
he made in philosophy regarding the natural law, a 
contribution upon which the schoolmen' of the ensuing 
centuries largely based their legal theories, it is 
essential to examine a few of the fundamental definitions 
of St. Thomas*
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Before giving the arguments proper in regards
to the natural law, it would he well to begin by making
two preliminary but fundamental statements. "Law”, says
St* Thomas, "is a rule and measure of acts, whereby
man is induced to act or is restrained from acting": and
"the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which
50
is the first principle of human acts*" Thus at the
very beginning of the * treatise on law* we have law and
reason identified* Here St. Thomas is clearly speaking
of law as a general conception: not any particular kind
of law, but law in the abstract* He felt, no doubt, that
the matter was one requiring more thorough elucidation,
and he therefore proceeded to supplement these statements:
"although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all
things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by
51
reason is contained under the law of reason*"
How the law of reason is closely to the law of 
nature, which man becomes aware of through his reason*
Thus St* Thomas had previously declared that "just as, 
in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemon­
strable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various 
sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by 
nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too^t 
is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general 
and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason 
needs to proceed to the more particular determination
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of certain matters* These particular determinations, dev­
ised by human reason, are called human laws, provided
52
the other essential conditions of law be observed.”
Of the law of nature, which is a divine law,
St, Thomas says that it is ’‘promulgated by the very fact
that God instilled into man* s mind so as to be known by
55
him naturally" ~ it is applied to man through the medium 
of reason; or, to put it in another way, man, by using 
his reason, participates in the eternal or divine law, for 
St, Thomas declares expressly that "the natural law is n
nothing else than the rational creature*s participation
54
of the eternal law.” It is, as it were, another outlet
of the eternal law or, again, the eternal law found in
the rational creature, For all things fall under the
55 '
Providence of God; and therefore, it logically must 
follow that they are eegulated by the decrees of the 
eternal law* By these decrees everything created is 
impressed with an Inclination towards an appointed end.
As we have stated above, the law by which this disposit­
ion of things is determined may be considered in God,
Who by an act which is virtually transient proceeding 
from the Divine Intellect, together with His Will and 
Power, has ordained it in the way which it is; ofc, it may 
be considered in the created being who complies with the 
arrangement prefixed before time by an eternal God*
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Thus It is this participation of the eternal law by the
56
rational creature which is known as the natural law*
These passages serve to indicate how St* Thomas
links the natural to the eternal law, and how all laws
are based on the natural law through the process of
human reason* According to St* Thomas the whole uniberse
is "governed by Divine Reason," as stated above, and that
57
government functions through the eternal law, to which
"all actions and movements of the whole of nature are 
58
subject.1* Since man by the use of reason participates 
in the eternal law through the law of nature, St* Thomas 
enlarges upon this conception by stating that "every 
knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and particip­
ation of the eternal law? and this leads him to define
59
the eternal law as "unchangeable truth". Therefore it
follows that since the natural law is the eternal law
in rational beings, of necessity it must follow that it
too may be defined as the "unchangeable truth"* We
readily recognise the combination of the eternal and
natural law when St. Thomas states that "all men know
the truth to a certain extent, at least to the common
principles of the natural law: and as to the others,
they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more,some
less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of
60
the eternal law.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
The participation in the eternal law which
belongs to rational creatures, is in a much more strict
sense a law, than that which belongs to the irrational
creatures; for it follows according to reason that the
higher creatures are subject to this law in a more
excellent manner than lower creatures. All creatures
share in the eternal law, but each one according to a
mode befftting its nature. Since law is, strictly
speaking, an ordinance of reason, the eternal law, as
is shared by creatures devoid of reaeon, can be called
61
a law only by "similitude”. The inclination to an end
imposed by nature on the irrational creature impels it
blindly and byoa physical necessity to its end; but
owing to the higher mode of participation in the eternal
law which is inherent in the rational creature, the law
62
in this instance imposes only moral necessity* It may
be also gathered from what has been said here that the
concept of the eternal law is wider than that of natural
law, for the eternal law subjects to its decrees ai.1
acts and motions of all creatures while the natural law
in its strict meaning and according to its proper aecept-
63
ation pertains only to rational creatures.
According to St* Thomas the precepts of the 
natural law are in the field of ^perabilia*, that is
64
to say, they are concerned with the things to be done*
i
Therefore, they belong to the practical reason* But just 
as being is the first thing which falls under the appreh-
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ension of the speculative reason, so ’good* (bonum) is
the first thing that falls under the apprehension of
practical reason, since an agent acts on account of
an end which is presented as good. Thus the first
principle of the practical reason is that we must both
do and seek after good, and we must avoid that which 
65
is evil. Thus St* Thomas gives us the first principle
or primary rule of the natural law; "This is the first
precept of the natpral law, that good is to be done and
ensued, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of
66
the natural law are based upon this,"
However, all those things to which we have 
a natural inclination are presented to us as good, and 
among the things which seem good to us we find a certain 
order* It is upon the relative value of these natural 
inclinations that the order in natural law is based, and 
it is because of the order which exists among 'goods1 
apprehended by the reason that we have a multiplicity 
of natural laws,
First among the things which we desire as good 
are things which we seek according to our nature insofar 
as this nature is common to all substances. Under the 
impulse of this inclination the law of nature impels us 
to self-preservation. Furthermore, we are inclined to 
good which agrees with our nature aam.iifc is shared by all 
animals* Of this St* Thomas says that the law corresp­
onding with this directs us to acts belonging to preserv-
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ation of the species and the education of the children;
and, finally, there are goods which we crave because
they are appropriate to our rational nature, proper to
ourselves and to all men* Under the dictate of natural
law emerging from this inclination, we seek to know God,
to live in society with other men without offence to
6?
them, and to avoid ignorance* Thus among the many prec­
epts of the naturi.1 law we find existing a certain order. 
Following the teaching of St* Thomas, there
68
can be no change in the natural law in the strict sense. 
For a change in natural law, St. Thomas states, may be 
understood in two ways: "First by way of addition.,, 
since mans'- things for the benefit of human life have 
been added over and above the natural law, both by the 
divine law and human laws. Secondly, a change in the 
natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, 
so that what was previously according to the natural law, 
ceases to be so* The possession of all things in 
common and universal freedom are said to be of the nat­
ural law because, to wit, the distinction of possessions 
and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised 
by human reason for the benefit of human life; thus
accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this
69
respect except by addition*M Immutibility is implicit 
in the concept of natural law because it id nothing 
else than the impress in men of the eternal law, com­
manding that the natural order of things be conserved.
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This natural order includes the essential relations of
things which like essences themselves, are immutible*
To quote again from the Doctor Angelieus regarding
the immutibility of the natural law, he states:
“There belongs to the natural law, first, certain most
general precepts, that are known to all* and secondly,
certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are,
as it were, conclusions following closely from first
principles* As to those general principles, the natural
law, in the abstract, can in nowise he blotted out from
men* s hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a
particular action insofar as reason is hindered from
applying the general principles to a particular point
of practice.... As to the other,!, e., the secondary
precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the
human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in
speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary
70
conclusions; or by vicious customs or corrupt habits."' 
Consequently, when we refer to the common first principle 
of the natural law, we can readily see that-there is no 
possibility of change.
However, in the interpretation of this doct­
rine, we must exercise caution. It is necessary to draw a 
line of distinction between first principles and conc­
lusions drawn fro$ these principles. What we have stated 
above concerning the immutibility of the natural law,
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applies only to those precepts which are designated
as primary# When we consider the secondary precepts of
this law, that is, those following as conclusions drawn
from the first, St# Thomas insists that even in these
the natural law is usually immutable, hut that it can
72
in certain cases and for a few, become mutable.
The explanation of this is that the law, when 
considered in its conclusions, does not always present 
the proper rectitude which belongs to it in its first 
principles, and even when the proper rectitude is pres­
ent, it is not equally known by all* Thus for example, 
the first principle of the natural, law commands that
we act according to reason. A conclusion derived from this
73
is that loans must be paid. Ordinarily this law would 
have obligation, but it may happen that greater harm 
would result from compliance with the law, and thus it 
would cease to be according to reason# likewise, in 
regards to the conclusions of the natural law, there 
is sometimes a lack of knowledge caused perhaps by 
custom, passion, or evil habit, and in this ease also 
we observe that the precepts of the natural law are mutable. 
For St# Thomas clearly states;
nThe natural law, as to general principles, is the same 
for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge# But 
as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, 
as it were, of those general principles, it is the same
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for all In the majority of cases, both as to rectitude
and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may
fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles
(just as natures subject to generation and corruption
fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and
as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted
by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of 
74
nature*”
We gather from this that when the matter falling 
under the precept is extrinsic to the Essence of God, 
there can be a kind of mutation* But it stands to reason 
that God "Summum Bomum” cannot will or give permissionl
to anyone to do that which is in itself evil, for example,
to blaspheme* This would be contrary to His Justice or
Holiness* He can, however, if the matter falling under
the law is something pertaining to creatures, withdraw
that matter from its inclusion under the law, or in
that particular instance remove the obligation to the law
without effecting any change whatsoever in the law.
This is because He has supreme dominion ovesr all things.
In this case it is not actually a change in the law so
much as abstraction from the obligation of the law, of
75
things that ordinarily/belong to it*
In conclusion, it can readily be seen that 
the conception of natural law in St* Thomas represents 
a marked development in the philosophy of the natural 
law* It is not so easy to determine how great an actual
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advance in theory is contained in this exposition. After 
reading the doctrine of St* Thomas on the subject in disc­
ussion, we are impressed with the methodical and analytical 
treatment which the Angelic Doctor has given to the 
various phases of his topic* He provides for us a definite 
answer to the questions and problems which arise in our 
minds concernong the natural law. He proves its existence, 
he defines its meaning, he examines its precepts, and 
he shows its co-relation to the eternal law and other 
branches of law. Briefly, he considers it from all angles, 
and whether or not we agree with him, he at least leaves 
us with no doubt as to his meaning and conception of 
the natural law. furthermore, we feel that this treat­
ment of St* Thomas fulfills the end or purpose of this 
thesis; however to.make the scholastic arguments more 
forceful we shall proceed to make use of the conception 
of another great scholastic - Francisco Suarez,
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FRANCISCO SUASSZ 
AND THE 
NATURAL LAW
Historians Have often made the statement that 
Scholasticism enjoyed its Golden Age during the medievil 
period, and that thereafter it lapsed into a permanent 
decline* Yet in certain countries scholasticism rose 
to new heights during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries* The truth is that the philosophy of schol­
asticism is of perrenial interest* And even to-day the 
best elements of scholasticism are winning their way 
in many quarters* An instance of this was to be seen 
not long ago in the year 1933 In the action of the 
Seventh Pan-American conference, which recognized 
Francisco De Vitoria, a Spanish schoolman, as having 
laid the foundation of modem international law, a 
title which was formerly held by Hugo Grotius*
Francisco Suarez, another Spanish Theologian,
76
(sometimes known as *the last of the great schoolmen*), 
is coming into his own, although it may be said that his 
name has long been familiar to the comparatively few 
who have dealt with the philosophy of law* To-day the 
esteem of those few for Suarez* work is shared by an 
increasing number whose opinion has been put into words 
by a leading American authority in the statement that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
Suarez Is the * prince of modern jurists’* Suarez prod­
uced three large tomes which contain an exhaustive treat­
ment of legal and political philosophy* The first of 
these masterpieces is the ’Traetatus de legihus a©
Deo legislator©*# a large volume of ten hooks, published 
Coimbra in the year 1612, Suarez being then prima prof­
essor of Theology at the University of Coimbra* The
*
second is the ’Defensio fidei Catholicae adversus 
AngLicanae sectae errores*, published in 1613, also 
at Coimbra, the occasion for which was the oath of 
allegiance which James the First of England and Sixth 
of Scotland had exacted from his Catholic subjedts, 
unjustly in their opinion, in the opinion of the Church, 
and in the opinion of posterity* The third treatise 
was the ’Opus de triplici virtute theologica*, left 
in manuscript at his death in 1617 and published four 
years later*
The great contribution of Suarez was to endow 
the modern world with an adequate philosophic basis for 
law in general* However, herein we are concerned mainly 
with his contribution to the natural law*
In discussing the subject of law, Suarez begins 
with a general definition of the term, ’law*, basing 
it upon the definition of St* Thomas Aquinas, which, 
as we have already seen, is *a rule and measure of acts
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whereby m»rt is induced to act or is restrained from
acting** After considering this definition in detail,
Suarez expands it for his purpose to read; ’strictly
and absolutely speaking, only that which is a measure
of rectitude, viewed absolutely, and consequently,
only that which is a right and virtuous rule can be 
77
called law** To this definition Suarez adds another,
based this time not only upon the authority of St*
Thomas but also upon that of the Roman jurist Papinian
"law is°common, just, and stable precept, which has
78
been sufficiently promulgated*** Justice, as wo Aid be 
expected, is a fundamental element in Suarez* definition* 
Thus a rule which is unjust is not law in the Suarezlan 
sense* But to Suarez, law must possess stability as well 
as universality of application and justice, because 
an unstable law is likely to be neither universal or 
just in its application* And of course the law, whatever 
its origin, must be made known, because if it is not 
promulgated, we cannot expect that it will be observed. 
Therefore Suarez sums up the latter definition with the 
fallowing clarification: **it is common in that it applies 
to all; it is just in that it is equitable and moral; 
it is a precept, meaning a rule of action; it is stable 
because of its permanent nature; and above all and beyond 
all, it is not something secret, for it must be made
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
known in such a way that, to paraphrase an ancient
79
maxim, ignorance of it will he no excuse.”
There are many kinds of law, hut in the
conception of Suarez there are three, eternal law,
divine law, and natural law, which have existed at all
times and at all places. First among these three branches
of law he places the eternal law, which he describes as
80
the "source and origin of all laws” an emanation from
the Creator of the world. The second, or divine law,
likewise emanates from the Creator, Who has mercifully
revealed its precepts that they may become not only
the possession but the guide of all human beings,
this revelation bei ng, in the terms of Suarez, a "species
81
of promulgation”. The third kind of law and that with 
which we are mainly concerned herein is termed natural 
law - meaning that it is in accordance with nature, that 
is to say, the nature which God Himself has created. 
Therefore, the natural law is said to be eternal. It is 
also divine on account of its origin. And finally, it 
is natural to man as one of God*s creatures, and its 
existence is discoverable by the eye of human reason*
To drive this point home, Suarez describes the law of 
nature as follows:
"...the natural light of the intellect - which is itself 
at hand, in readiness to describe what must be done - ... 
since men retain that law in their hearts, although they
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may be engaged in no specific act of reflection or 
8Sd
judgement•n
further revealing the relationship between
the eternal and. natural law in the human being, Suarez
shows how man is linked to the eternal by natural law
discovered through right reason: for he says that all
men necessarily behold within themselves some sort
of participation in the eternal law, since there is no
rational person who does not in some manner judge that
the virtuous course of action must be followed and the
base avoided; and in this sense, it is said that men
83
have some knowledge of the eternal law*
Thus as in all the teachings of the scholast­
ics there can readily be seen an inseparable connection
\
between the law eternal and the law natural, furthermore 
if the natural law is the eternal law in rational nat­
ure it must of necessity be regarded as right reason*
for all those things which natural enlightment makes
84
evident, pertain to the natural law. To prove this
point Suarez gives the following: "The exercise of
dominion and the function of ruling are characteristic
of law; ana in man, these functions are to be attributed
to right reason, that he may be rightly governed in
accordance with nature; therefore, the natural law must
be constituted in the reason, as in the immediate and
85
intrinsic rule of human actions.”
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Natural law resides in man, since it does not
reside in God, being temporal and created, nor is it
external to man, since it is written not upon tablets
but in the heart; neirther does it dwell immediately
within human nature itself, since we have proved that
it does not do so; nor is it in the will, since it
does not depend upon the will of man, but, on the
contrary, binds and (as it were) coerces his will;
hwnce, this natural law must necessarily reside in the 
86
reason.
It can easily be seen that there are things 
recognized through the light of natural reason. However, 
those things may be divided into three classes. First, 
some of them are primary and general principles of moral­
ity, such principles as: “one must do good and avoid 
evil”, “do not to another that which you would not wish 
done to yourself”, and the like. There is no doubt that 
these principles pertain to the natural law. Again, 
there are certain others, more definite and specific, 
which, nevertheless, are so self-evident truths by their 
very terminology. Examples of the second group are these 
principles: “justice must be observed”; "God must be 
worshipped”; “One must live temporately"; and so forth. 
Neither is there any doubt concerning the fact that this 
grpup comes under the natural law. In the third class, 
we place those conclusions which are deduced from natural
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known save through rational reflection* Of these 
conclusions some are recognized more easily than others, 
and by a greater number of persons; as, for example, the 
inferences that adultry, theft, and similar acts are 
wrong# Other conclusions require more reflection, of 
a sort not easily within the capacity of all, as in the 
case with the inferences that usury is unjust, that 
lying can never be justified, and the like* Strictly 
speaking the natural law works more through the proximate 
principles or conclusions than through universal princ­
iples; for a law is a proximate rule of operation, and 
the general principles above mentioned are not rules
save insofar as they are definitely applied by specific
87
rules to the individual sorts of acts or virtues* In 
such a case the natural law and right reason can be 
regarded as synonomous.
At this point it is appropriate to ask the 
question, how does Suarez define the natural law?
And his answers are composed and collected in the 
following;
The natural law is the rule whereby eaeh of us is
commanded to do to another, what he would wish done
to himself, a rule which is contained in the Law and 
88
in the Gospel. Further more it is the proximate rule
89
of moral goodness. And still further on in his writing
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Suarez continues to speak of the natural law as that law
which springs not from human opinion, hut from the
90
evidence afforded by nature. And in speaking of its
existence he says that it is the actual of the mind that
91
the natural law exists.
The latter definition of Suarez should be 
expanded upon. As we know, the natural law is not evid­
ent as is the ground beneath us and the heavens above 
us; for the natural law may be called the natural light 
of the intellect, inherently adapted for presclbing 
what must be done since men retain that law in their 
hearts, although they may be engaged in no act of 
reflection or judgement. The discovery of natural law 
may be by means of deliberate reflection, but it may also 
be Instinctive; in either ease it is the result of the 
natural light of the intellect. It is a thing inherent in 
man because written there by the hand of God Himself.
Thus according to the conception of Suarez, the 
natural law is inherent. So also is the conscience 
inherent in man. Yet the two are different. For the 
term law has reference to a rule respecting those things 
which should be done and framed in general terms; whereas 
conscience is a practical dictate in a particular case, 
so that it is the application of the law to a particular 
act, so to speak, rather than the law itself. Thus,
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following Suarez* reasoning and rightly so, the natural 
law is the general standard and conscience is the atanfl— 
ard of the individual*
As an emanation of the eternal law, the natural 
law carries with it an obligation proceeding from the 
Divine Will, that men shall be bound to obey that which 
right reason dictates* In the domaih of natural law, a 
thing is in essence good or bad* The natural law does 
not make bad what it condemns but prohibits it because 
it is bad, inmother words because it is inherently evil*
In this sense the natural law partakes of and indeed is the 
divine law. Thus as a result, the natural law is a moral 
law, and therefore, embraces all precepts or moral 
principles which are plainly characterized by righteous­
ness necessary to virtuous conduct. The converse is also 
true in that the natural law prohibits those thing* which 
are essentially evil. Thus is evident in Suarez* 
conception that the natural law is revealed by natural 
illumination with the consequence that the natural law 
is binding in conscience for the judge in the forum 
of conscience is reason itself.
In order to strengthen his views, Suarez cont­
inues to define the natural law so as not to leave a 
doubt as to his meaning of natural law* lor he says: 
"Natural law is a unified whole with respect to all men 
and in all places....The rational basis of this position 
is that the law in question is a peculiar quality aceomp-
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anying not the paticular rational faculty of any given
individual, but rather that characteristic nature which
92
is the same in all men.” Thus the natural law in that
it relates to its substance is one and the same among
all men,"but*«•insofar as concerns the knowledge of it,
93
that law is not complete among all.”
Although a given condition may demand the 
application of one precept and not of another, the 
natural law is nevertheless always the same and comprises 
the same precepts; sinee the latter are either principles, 
or else conclusions derived therefrom by a necessary 
inference, and consequently possess a necessary quality 
of which they are not devoid with respect to any cond­
ition whatsoever* Finally, it may be asserted that in 
connection even with the natural law one may consider 
either its negative or affirmative precepts. The negat­
ive precepts must necessarily be and have always been 
the same for all conditions of human nature; for they 
prohibit actions intrinsically evil, which are therefore 
evil for every such condition. Furthermore, they are 
binding without intermission, and consequently, binding 
aldo for ©very human condition, whenever the proper ; 
subject-matter shall be involved*
The affirmative precepts, on the other hand, 
in like manner prescribe actions which are righteous 
of themselves, and consequently possess always the same 
righteous nature; and, nevertheless, since they are not 
binding without intermission, it may be that in connection
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with one particular human state there will arise occasions
to observe certain of these precepts, and in connection
with another human state occasions for the observance
of other precepts* Yet this fact' does not suffice to
justify the assertion that the law itself is diversified
in character. For even in the corrupted state of human
nature, a time of peac® is one thing, a time of war is
quite another thing, and during these times respectively,
diverse precepts must be observed. Furthermore, the art
of medicine is one and the same art, even though it
prescribes that certain things shall be done in the time
of health, and other things in the time of illness.
It is in such a sense, then, that the natural law is one 
94
and the same.
After viewing the definitions of the natural 
law in the lucid Suarezlan style, we are left without 
a doubt as to what the natural law isj for his style is 
put before us in the true scholastic manner and that is 
without a loophole. And since now we know what the natural 
law is, the next logical and conclusive step is to prove 
its main attribute - immutability.
It is a truism among scholastics that the nat­
ural law is Immutable. The natural law being synonomous 
with rational nature, it "cannot of itself lapse or 
suffer change, whether in its entirety, or in its individ­
ual precepts, so long as rational endures together with
95
the use of reason and the freedom of will."
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The natural law, therefore, exists and It continues to
exist; but it applies to conditions which are not immut-
able* The precept is unchangeable; its application may
vary from age to age* For according to Suarez the
natural law discerns the mutability in the subject-matter
itself, and adapts its own precepts to this mutability,
prescribing in regard to such subject-matter a certain
sort of conduct for one condition and another sort of
conduct for another condition; so that law in itself
remains at all times unchanged, although, according to our
manner of. speaking and by an extrinsic attribution, it
96
would, seem, after a fashion, to undergo a change*
Suarez maintained that like the divine law, 
the natural law may not be changed by man because both 
are the law of the Creator* The natural law, moreover, 
is the form of the eternal law directed especially to 
God’s creatures in their lives and in their intercourse 
with one another* And while it is unchangeable, human 
conditions, as we know, change from time to time; and 
reasonable beings, such as Suarez and the members of the 
scholastic school generously considered their fellow 
creatures to be, would therefore bring into being human 
laws - in harmony with and based upon the natural law - 
to meet the changing conditions* Thus as human reason 
develops, the application of the natural law through 
human £aw likewise develops and changes, although the 
natural law itself remains eternally the same, being,
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as we have seen eternal in its nature.
Suarez basis his first proof of the immutability 
of the natural law in accordance with the conceptions of 
St. Thomas and St. Augustine in view of eternal truths.
For he maintains that the precepts of the natural law 
are necessary and characterized by eternal truth, since 
that law comprises self-evident moral principles to­
gether with all the conclusions - and only thode conclus­
ions - which are drawn therefrom by a process of necessary 
inferences, whether proxlmately or through a series of 
such inferences. But all these elements are eternally 
true, since this truth in the principles does not 
subsist apart from the truth of the conclusions in 
question, the principles themselves being necessarily 
true by their very definition. Therefore, all of the 
precepts in question are of a perpetual character.
And, consequently, they cannot cease to be, solely
97
through lapse of time.
It follows as a necessary consequence from 
the immutability of the natural law as such that (to 
use the words of Suarez) "no human power can abrogate 
any proper precept of natural law, nor truly and essent­
ially restrict such a precept, nor grant a dispensation 
98
from it.n
This has been seen from previous statements; 
for it has been shown that the natural law, insofar as 
its precepts are concerned, is by its very nature
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unchangeable; and men cannot change that which is unchange- 
99
able. Therefore, it stands to reason thfct men cannot
change the natural law. This is true also by the fact
that the natural law, in all its precepts, relates to
the natural qualities of mankind; but man cannot change
the nature of things; therefore, neither can man change
100
the natural law. And what has been seen that in the
case of every precept of the natural law, God is the
law-giver; and man cannot change a law that God has
established, simee an inferior cannot prevail against 
101
his superior* Therefore it stands to reason that man
cannot change the precepts which God has put before him -
in the natural law. The natural law is the foundation
of human law; therefore, human law cannot derogate its
100
own foundation and consequently itself* If "human law 
could derogate from the natural law, it would be possible 
for the former to make an enactment in opposition to 
the. latter, since one can conceive of no other way of 
changing the natural law; but human law cannot make 
such an enactment for such an enactment would be 
contrary to right reason based upon what has been said 
previously; and a, law contrary to right reason ceases 
to be law. Furthermore, it has,been amply shown that what v. 
is contrary to the natural law is intrinsically evil; 
Therefore, the human law in question would relate to an 
intrinsically evil matter and in consequence would not 
constitute a law.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, one can readily see that the 
theory of natural law is one which is profoundly 
important in the philosophy of political theory®,
We have seen this in the historical approach used in the 
pages of the proceeding chapters that all schools 
through the' ages were influenced hy a conception of 
natural law underlying their doctrines. In the politics 
of the Greeks, the originators of political science, 
there permeated the predominance of the idea of 
*reason*• Among the Stoics we found that the ultimate 
principle behind all their conception of law was the con­
ception of * justice*. The Homan lawyers were so per­
sistent in their teachings that they based their devel­
opment of law on the ‘law of nature*. We also saw 
the Christian doctrine of natural law as exposed by 
a long line of Christian teachers in early and medieval 
times beginning with St, Paul and basing their concept­
ion on the teachings of Christ* However, all these give 
certain testimony of the cardinal significance of the 
idea of natural law.
In dealing with the doctrine of Natural Law 
we felt that it was necessary for the sake of clarity 
to consider the concept historically before addressing 
ourselves to the examination of the conception of the 
Scholastics which we maintain to the utmost*
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To defend the doctrine of natural law we 
deemed it fit and proper to use the views and arg­
uments of two of the most recognized scholastics - 
St* Thomas Aquinas and .Francisco Suarez - worthy 
representatives of the scholastic doctrine of the 
natural law.
Thus in accord with the historical account of the 
presence of the natural law in the different eras of 
history, we have attempted to use only those historical 
eras which we deemed necessary to fulfill the purpose 
of this thesis* And, again, the conceptions of St. Thomas 
and Suarez were used to enforce the scholastic stand­
point* If that has been brought to light then the 
purpose of this thesis has been fulfilled*
Therefore, in view of the proceeding pages, 
we feel convinced that the arguments used have clearly 
exposed the existence of the natural law; and, what it 
is, has been sufficiently pointed out* As to its 
immutability, no more need be said; for after employ­
ing the proofs afforded by great minds such as St*
Thomas and Suarez to bring out the scholastic conception, 
we are left without a doubt as to the universal and 
immutable character of the natural law*
As a concluding thought, let it suffice to 
say that man is an individual entity and as such has an 
inclination to preserve his own being, and to safeguard
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his own welfare; he is also a being corruptible - that 
is to say, mortal - and as such is inclines towards 
the preservation of the species, and towards the act­
ions necessary to that end. And finally, he is a 
rational being, and as such, is suited for immortality, 
for spiritual perfection, and for communication with 
God and social intercourse with rational creatures.
Thus, whatever it be, whether for his preservation, 
or his safety, or his actions towards his end, or 
social relations, man must act in accordance with the 
natural law based upon the conception of the scholastics 
in his relation with God, with his neighbor, actions 
which are ultimately for his own good*
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